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The philosopher of ambiguity: exploring stories of spirituality of people with 
aphasia through the lens of Merleau-Ponty 
 
Abstract 
Spirituality as a concept has only recently begun to be considered in speech and language 
therapy research and practice, and phenomenology as a research methodology is also not 
widely used in SLT research. Yet, concepts propounded by the phenomenologist Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty arguably offer a useful theoretical framework from which to view certain 
aspects of SLT including the concept of spirituality and how this is expressed by people with 
a communication difficulty. 
In this project, eight people with aphasia were interviewed about their spirituality. The 
interviews were transcribed, themes identified and stories created. These stories were 
viewed using one of the concepts propounded by Merleau-Ponty, namely ambiguity.  
Background 
Spirituality has only recently begun to be explored in the speech and language therapy 
literature (MacKenzie, 2015, 2016; Mathisen, Carey, Carey-Sargeant, Webb, Millar, and 
Krikheli, 2015; Mathisen and Threats, 2018; Spillers, 2007, 2011), in contrast to in healthcare 
in general (Cobb, Puchalski and Rumbold, 2012) and nursing in particular (for example, Bash, 
2004; Swinton, Bain, Ingram and Heys (2011); Daly and Fahey-McCarthy, 2014), where a 
plethora of studies exists.  
Defining a term such as spirituality is an impossible, and arguably a potentially reductive, 
task. The spiritual realm reaches into so many different facets of the human condition and 
experience – culture, art, nature, theology, philosophy – that it cannot be comfortably 
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minimised into a sound bite.  Its power perhaps lies, in fact, in its inability to be reduced to a 
definable concept (Swinton and Pattison, 2010); spirituality means something different – 
but something equally important – to each person.  
Yet, many authors have at least attempted a definition, and most people have an 
understanding of what spirituality is even if they have difficulty in then putting that 
understanding into words. It is perhaps useful to gather some of the terms which are 
frequently mooted in attempts to define spirituality, in order to start to create some of the 
vocabulary which may be helpful.  Cobb, Puchalski and Rumbold (2012, p. vii) talk about 
“purpose and meaning of human existence”, Swinton (2010, p. 19) of “meaning, purpose, 
value, hope and love” and Vanier (1999, p. 97) of how “spirituality flows from being fully 
human”.   
This vocabulary may be helpful for those of us with intact language skills, but what of those 
who struggle with expressing themselves through language? A recent hermeneutic 
phenomenological research project took the form of constructing stories of spirituality with 
people with expressive aphasia following stroke. These stories were then analysed and 
made sense of through the lens of the work of the philosopher Merleau-Ponty, in particular 
through his ideas around ambiguity. 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy has influenced much nursing research of recent years (Sadala 
and Adorno, 2002; Thomas, 2005; Hjelmblink, Bernsten, Uvhagen, Kunkel and Holmstrőm, 
2007; Nyström, 2011; Kitzmüller, Hȁggström and Asplund, 2013). Thomas (2005, p. 63) 
asserts that Merleau-Ponty is an “excellent fit for nursing”, as he taps into the 
“antireductionist and antipositivist stance” espoused by many current nurse researchers 
and, indeed, nurse practitioners. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy focusses on the relationship of 
3 
 
our bodies to the world and to ourselves; according to Merleau-Ponty, our body is our 
means of being in the world. People who are ill or who have a new disability are “living an 
unreliable body” (Kitzmüller, Hȁggström and Asplund, 2013, p. 24), which has a different 
way of being in the world to the body they once had. It is for this reason, amongst others, 
that he has been frequently cited in some health literature. 
Although by contrast Merleau-Ponty’s work has been little used in the speech and language 
therapy literature, his emphasis on embodiment, as well as his leitmotif of ambiguity, 
render his work highly applicable to people with communication impairment; indeed, one of 
the chapters in his magnum opus, Phenomenology of Perception, is entitled “The Body as 
Expression, and Speech”, and he uses the phenomenon of aphasia to illustrate key concepts 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 202). Aphasia is the disruption to receptive and/or expressive 
language, following damage to the language areas of the brain, most notably as a result of 
cerebrovascular accident or stroke. It is estimated that, in the United Kingdom, 33% of 
people who have a stroke will present with aphasia (The Stroke Association), and that there 
are approximately 350 000 people currently living with aphasia in the UK. Aphasia may 
affect the individual’s ability to express language verbally or in written form, or their ability 
to understand spoken and written language. In severe cases of so-called global aphasia, 
both receptive and expressive abilities may be impaired. 
Merleau-Ponty is known as “the philosopher of ambiguity” (van Manen, 2016, p 130), which 
perhaps also qualifies him as an apposite philosopher when a nebulous concept such as 
spirituality is under consideration; Thomas (2005, p 73) says of him that he identifies as “the 
philosopher who does not know”.  Although Merleau-Ponty has thus far been little used in 
the speech and language therapy literature, this key aspect of his philosophical stance also 
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makes him an “excellent fit” (Thomas, 2005, p. 63) for thinking about aphasia and 
spirituality.  
Merleau-Ponty (2002, p. 89) asserts that between the worlds of empiricism (physiology) and 
intellectualism (psychology), there exists a third way, where ambiguity lies, but that “this 
ambiguity is not some imperfection of consciousness or existence, but the definition of 
them” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 387). In a study of the nebulous concept of spirituality with 
participants with at times ambiguous language output, this concept of a third way provided 
a useful framework for analysis and understanding. 
Methods 
In keeping with much qualitative research (Holliday, 2007, p.120), I will employ the first 
person pronoun, which refers to the lead researcher. I recruited eight people with aphasia 
from both an acute rehabilitation ward and stroke groups by purposive sampling  
(Silverman, 2006, p. 306; Robson, 2011, p. 275). Three participants had suffered a stroke 
that led to aphasia less than 4 weeks prior to the interview. Five participants had been living 
with their aphasia for more than 9 months. All participants presented with reduced 
expressive language skills in the context of good auditory comprehension. Ethical approval 
was gained from the NHS and the University Faculty Ethics Committee respectively. 
Group 1: people who had been living with 
aphasia < 4 weeks 
Group 2: people who had been living with 
aphasia > 9 months 
Liam David  
Amy Francesca 
Rosemary Leanne 
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 Joel 
 Peter 
 
The phenomenological research question was: 
What is it like to express your spirituality when you have aphasia? 
Each participant was interviewed using a conversational approach (Kim, 2016); a loose topic 
guide served as an aide memoire for me, containing questions such as “ what gives your life 
meaning?” and “what does the word spirituality mean to you?”, but was not rigidly adhered 
to, allowing participants to create their own narrative. Participants used speech to 
communicate, but also non-verbal, so-called total communication methods (or ramps 
(McVicker, 2007)), such as writing key words, gesture and facial expression. 
All conversations were audio recorded. In order to analyse this phenomenological study 
arising from a constructivist epistemology, a flexible analytic approach propounded by 
Braun and Clarke (2006) was used. Thematic analysis was used for “identifying, analysing 
and reporting patterns” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p 6). The first step was to familiarise 
myself with the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p 160); I achieved this by listening several 
times to the recorded interviews. Each interview was listened to and the transcripts read 
multiple times in order to dwell with (Heidegger, 1962, p 80; Finlay, 2011, p 229) and 
immerse myself in (Robson, 2011, p 476) the data. I found this an invaluable strategy, 
because by listening to the interview again, I could re-imagine myself with the participant, 
and could then remember gestures or facial expressions which I had not noted down at the 
time. As I transcribed the interviews, I listened to the recordings multiple times, not only 
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noting the verbal responses, but also the non-verbal, such as gesture, facial expression and 
intonation.  
Initial codes (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 18) were generated and noted on the transcripts; 
on each script, I highlighted words and phrases that seemed important, and gave broad 
names to the theme they illustrated, such as “trauma of the stroke”, “life meaning” or 
“connection”. Themes were searched for, reviewed and named (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 
22) at first in tabular form, then woven into complete stories for each participant; only a 
small sample of the stories are quoted here. Because spirituality is notoriously difficult to 
define, or perhaps defies definition altogether, I had no preconceived ideas as to what 
themes might arise during the conversations. The thematic analysis, then, was inductive in 
approach, and it was only when I came to analyse groupings of data together (that is, all the 
conversations with people with aphasia) that themes common to several participants 
started to be discovered. 
Analysis 
To ‘do’ phenomenology, one must always begin with the lived experience, but that 
experience may be hazy, ambivalent or undefined. Merleau-Ponty (1964, p. 160) urges us to 
eschew the “vagabond endeavours” of positivism which offer “assurance of unambiguous 
and accurate knowledge of the world” (Crotty, 1998 p. 18), and instead try to perceive the 
meaning of a phenomenon as it is given to us, in all its uncertainty and ambiguity. Lewis and 
Staehler (2010, p. 190) acknowledge that “a phenomenological investigation discloses an 
essential ambiguity at the core of our existence”, and this is perhaps particularly apposite 
when one is endeavouring to reveal a facet of a person such as their spirituality, which is 
necessarily individual, unique and nebulous. Within this study, a light was shone on the 
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ambiguous concept of spirituality, expressed in the sometimes ambiguous language of 
people with aphasia.  
The aphasic language of the participants contained neologisms and paraphasias, palilalia 
and fillers; the onus was often on me as listener to attempt to create certainty through 
facilitative techniques and listening skills, or the person with aphasia themselves to try to 
navigate this land of linguistic ambiguity, by creating their own landmarks in gesture, writing 
or drawing, developing “several ways for the human body to sing the world’s praises and in 
the last resort to live in it” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 218). As communication changed 
following the stroke, so too did identity and sense of self; if, as Merleau-Ponty says, we only 
have access to the world via the lived body, if that body is altered, so must our experience 
of the world be changed. 
Merleau-Ponty posits that there is nothing solely physical or completely psychological in 
experience (Merleau-Ponty, 2002) and so it proved in the stories of spirituality, where 
ambiguity also manifested itself in narratives of altered states of consciousness and visions. 
Finally, although ambiguity abounded throughout the stories of spirituality, windows of 
clarity also asserted themselves, contrasting with haziness. 
Ambiguity and the language of aphasia 
Within the study, predictable aphasic errors were evident in the participants’ interviews, 
such as word retrieval difficulties, paraphasias, neologisms, palilalia, overuse of fillers, 
reduced syntactic complexity, latency of response and favoured automatic words/phrases. 
For example, David’s output was characterised at times by lack of content words, or 
erroneous word choice, so that responses were unclear in relation to the subject at hand: 
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for example, he said “we don’t really love really” in response to whether he was able to 
work after his stroke. He also sometimes produced unintelligible strings of phonemes, and 
‘empty’ speech containing few content words but with good preserved syntactic structure 
which belied his inability to retrieve the target word at times. David wryly repeated my word 
‘struggling’ as he attempted to offer his definition of spirituality, a reflection perhaps both 
of the complexity of the concept, but also of his word finding difficulties: 
D: But…er…I find it very very…sort of…I can see all the world…erm…er…(latency) er…just 
because I didn’t accept…that…you know…the…(latency) erm…I don’t know…what’s (laughs) 
cos I  
S: You’re struggling to… 
D: Yeah 
S: put it into words 
D: Struggling, that’s right 
Joel often confused gender and pronouns in his word selection, which tended to lend parts 
of our conversation a confused and ambiguous tenor: 
S: You were driving? 
J: Yes 
S: Wow, OK, OK. And were you alone in the car? 
J: No, no…boy, well girl 
S: Your girl? 
J: No, boy 
S: Your boy? 
J: No, no, no…man 
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S: Do you mean your wife? 
J: No no no because it was a female, no no, male 
S: Male – right. A male relative? 
J: No no no 
S: A male friend? 
J: There…er yes and 
Joel was also the only participant in group 1 or 2 who habitually used neologisms, 
particularly the phrase [məʊ məʊ]. He seemed aware of this neologism and that it was not 
the intended word or phrase, and so it was often accompanied by an embarrassed laugh. In 
all the ambiguity of language and non-language, there was the added confusion of 
embarrassment.  Francesca and David also used laughter which seemed to serve the role of 
camouflaging word finding difficulties. Similarly, Joel used the phrase “for now” when he 
had attempted to convey something but the words eluded him and his listener was not able 
to facilitate. It seemed to signify ‘let’s leave it, as I can’t find the right words, and you can’t 
help me’; perhaps another indication of ambiguity in the world of aphasia. 
Ambiguity present in aphasic output during the interviews seemed to be exacerbated by 
emotive content, and mitigated by meaning-making content. When Peter described the 
traumatic day of his stroke, his language was lacking in content words (nouns, verbs, 
adjectives) and his gestures were indistinct: 
S: No. So what were you thinking during that time? 
P: (hand movement, pause) I was thinking about trying to get back in but obviously I 
wouldn’t be able to…erm…I don’t really know (shakes head) erm no 
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In contrast, he clearly conveyed information, about plants and grafting of plants in his 
garden (gardening being one of his identified meaning-makers), both verbally and using 
gesture: 
“I did erm this was three different plants and I (gesture with both hands, finger of left hand 
crossing fingers of right) then er er created plants er er and then erm oh they would just 
small bits of erm they were just small bits of garden and I joined all of the things together 
and made it what I did was er if I can hoe (gestures hoeing)”. 
Similarly, Francesca had significant word finding difficulties in general conversation, and her 
responses often comprised only one or two words, but when asked about opera, she was 
able to name several favourite composers. Proper nouns are often problematic for people 
with aphasia (Beeson, Holland and Murray, 1997), so this is perhaps testament to the 
importance opera and composers held in her life. 
Ambiguity in aphasic language lies not only with the speaker, however. Seemingly 
conflicting statements, may also have been in part due to my limitations as facilitator, since 
“[c]ommunication difficulty belongs equally to those with the impairment and those who 
struggle to communicate with them.” (Hewitt and Pound, 2014, p 181). 
For example David gives this response to a question about faith: 
“I’m not that religious. I’m when I’d say I’m…I must admit I am very religious” 
and Leanne at one point makes conflicting comments about her ability to remember and 
express learnt liturgy. Compare the following two interchanges: 
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S: Yes, OK, so things like…um…things that you would have learnt at an early age, I presume, 
like the Hail Mary or the Our Father 
L: Oh, yes (emphatic) 
S: Do you remember those? Can you recite those now? 
L: Oh, yes 
S: OK so they’re quite…almost automatic 
L: Yeah 
S: So they still come out fluently? 
L: Yes 
 
S: So…er…when it comes to saying…er…er…liturgy 
L: (gestures “zip” across mouth) 
S: Is that possible for you? 
L: No no 
S: No, so it doesn’t…is familiar liturgy…so er like the Lord’s Prayer 
L: Yep 
S: or Hail Mary 
L: Yes 
S: Are you able to say that? 
L: No no (shakes head) 
S: Absolutely not. So do you say it in your head? 
L: Yes, uhuh 
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Amy in group 1 also gave what appeared to be conflicting information about whether or not 
her grandchildren had visited recently. This discrepancy may again have been a reflection of 
my inability to grasp fully what she was conveying, or perhaps it reflected Amy wanting to 
see them more than she did. Ambiguity of language in these examples cannot be mitigated 
either by the participants’ total communication skills, nor by the facilitation techniques of 
the researcher. 
This inability of the listener sometimes to understand the message was not confined to me. 
During the interview with Joel, his wife was at one point summoned in order to help him 
find a specific Bible verse. She was unable to understand which verse he was alluding to, 
and he said “no, no” in a frustrated tone. In this way, a glimpse was offered into their day-
to-day existence, where ambiguity of meaning and an inability to clarify was rife. 
The participants with aphasia attempted to mitigate the ambiguity in their aphasic output in 
a number of ways, many of which were successful.  Francesca’s speech output was limited 
and telegraphic; she tended to use single words or short phrases. To augment this, she used 
gesture on a number of occasions; for example, the word for a CT scanner eluded her, so 
she was able to gesture leaning back. She also gestured her father holding her hand, a 
gesture which was arguably more evocative than the spoken message alone would have 
been.  She was able to cue herself in using sequences, particularly with numbers, for 
example, when she told me how old she was when she had a her stroke:  “yes, 
thirty…forty…fifty-one”.  
Leanne also used gesture to good effect, such as when she zipped her mouth shut when I 
asked her if she was still able to recite liturgy in church. She also used facial expression and 
intonation to great effect; she was a poet, so perhaps this meant she had a natural affinity 
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for prosody. Writing, though, was her most used and most efficacious augmentative 
communication method; she wrote key words when the spoken form eluded her, which 
sometimes cued her in to uttering the spoken form, or sometimes simply enabled her 
interlocutor/reader to understand. Ambiguity was averted by this written record, which also 
acted as a referent to come back to during the conversation. 
Joel used a form of circumlocution in order to cue his listener into elusive words. For 
example, when he was unable to find the word ‘apostle’ or ‘disciple’ in his lexicon, he 
ingeniously counted to twelve, which, along with context, was enough to alert me to the 
intended word. At various times he used intonation to convey the message; at different 
times in the interview he expressed lack of equivocation (when it was suggested his word-
finding problems must be frustrating), emphasis (such as when he asserted that he was still 
able to pray) and enthusiasm (for reading the Bible, for example).  
Peter used physical prompts to try and cue himself in to words he was unable to retrieve; he 
often tapped his thigh as if coaxing out the target word. He also paused, giving himself time 
to find the word.  
David was the person in group 2 closest to the stroke event, and he is the participant who 
used augmentative, total communication strategies the least. This may be because he was 
not yet at the rehabilitation stage needed in order to contemplate methods other than 
speech. May of his utterances remained ambiguous, with the meaning not quite 
understood. 
Amy, Liam and Rosemary in group 1, who were even closer to their stroke event than David 
was to his, also used few total communication strategies to mitigate the ambiguity of verbal 
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output. Amy’s use of the occasional gesture (such as hands together for ‘prayer’, or hand on 
head for ‘blessing’) was effective but infrequent. Rosemary used excellent eye contact and 
facial expression in the context of severely reduced verbal output which, although they 
helped in forging relationship and connection, did not facilitate language comprehension 
and expression per se. Of all the participants, Liam was the least able to mitigate the 
ambiguity of his aphasic output with any attempts at total communication. Our interview 
was peppered with pauses, as he struggled to process what was said to him and/or to 
formulate a response. 
As a speech and language therapist, I attempted to use learnt skills to mitigate the 
ambiguity in the participants’ output. For example, I checked back using mirroring or 
paraphrasing to ensure correct understanding, and I cued in participants by starting off a 
sentence for them, hoping they would be able to complete it. Participants were allowed 
plenty of time to respond and given non-committal responses (such as ‘uhuh’), to show 
attentiveness. Questioning intonation was also employed to encourage further output or 
elaboration of what had been said. Throughout the interviews, I tried to keep a 
“phenomenological attitude” (van Manen, 2016, p. 32) of wonder, curiosity and 
attentiveness, employing active listening strategies, such as leaning forward, maintaining 
eye contact and nodding.  
Artefacts were used during some interviews, in order to mitigate ambiguity. For example, 
artefacts were presented to Joel in the hope that they might stimulate some more 
discussion about spirituality and, in his case, Christianity. Nebulous and difficult concepts 
could be tackled when Joel had objects in front of him to refer to and to prompt 
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conversation. Some objects even seemed to stimulate remembered liturgy, such as the 
communion wafer in this example: 
J: (struggle behaviour) testament 
S: Testament 
J: Yes 
S: Fantastic 
J: Yes 
S: Yeah, so the cup goes with this (shows wafer)? 
J: Yeah, yeah (struggle) blood…the blood 
S: Yeah 
J: Hmm 
S: So, this is the body, the cup is the blood 
J: Blood, yeah 
S: Yeah 
J: Drink 
S: Yep 
J: In remembrance of me  
Occasionally, despite these contingencies, ambiguity within interaction between me and the 
participants with aphasia remained and conversation could not be repaired: 
S: Yeah, so you have a quite a positive attitude? 
L: I don’t know, I don’t know 
S: No 
L: I don’t know 
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Aphasic language can be ambiguous in nature, with frequent linguistic errors made by the 
speaker, and misunderstandings on the part of the listener. Lewis and Staehler (2010, p 192) 
state that Merleau-Ponty’s contention was that a “satisfying account of language can thus 
take its departure neither from isolated words, nor from a mere accumulation of words”, 
suggesting that understanding of language depends on an understanding of interrelated 
aspects, rather than individual elements. This speaks to the way the participants attempted 
to mitigate the ambiguity of their now-impaired language system, by implementing myriad 
total communication startegies. 
Ambiguity and identity 
As well in the language of the participants with aphasia, ambiguity was also evident in their 
altered sense of identity. It is a well-documented fact (Ellis-Hill and Horn, 2000; Shadden, 
2005; Simmons-Mackie and Damico, 2008) that people who have aphasia following a stroke 
may experience a feeling of lost or changed identity. In this study, participants exhibited 
some ambiguity in their role but were sometimes successfully finding new ones. For 
example, Leanne had been a novelist prior to her stroke, and now wrote literature in the 
form of poetry. David was no longer able to work or to engage in the drawing in which he 
was trained but was exploring sculpture as an alternative artistic medium. The first thing 
that Francesca said about herself was that she was an accountant; her identity seemed to be 
formed through her profession. Although no longer able to work as an accountant, she had 
forged a new role as helper at the stroke group to which she belonged. Perhaps this 
apparent fluidity of identity is reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty’s assertion that ambiguity is a 
key aspect of his identity: 
“I know myself only in ambiguity” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p 402). 
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Ambiguity and altered states of consciousness 
Confusion around the stroke event also seemed to have created an atmosphere of 
ambiguity for some participants. Liam, for example, did not remember (or at least was not 
able to convey) what happened on the day of his stroke. David admitted that he did not 
know what was happening to him as he had his stroke: “I had nothing. I did no idea”. 
Altered states of consciousness that often surrounded the stroke event lent their own 
ambiguity to the participants’ stroke stories. David recounted that he was conscious during 
the trauma of the stroke happening:  
D: No, erm…I remember it all. I wish it wasn’t 
S: Do you? Right, so you weren’t unconscious at all? 
D: No 
S: Right, so you remember it all 
Leanne was conversely unconscious for three days, and during this time she reported that 
she saw graphic visions of angels and of her dead parents.  
If, as McGilchrist (2010, p. 115) posits, “whatever can’t be brought into focus and fixed, 
ceases to exist as far as the speaking hemisphere is concerned”, perhaps if the speaking 
hemisphere is damaged and the so-called non-dominant hemisphere comes more into play, 
more nebulous, less “fixed” concepts are allowed to be entertained by the brain. During the 
interview, even Leanne herself appreciated the unlikeliness of the reality of these visions, or 
the identity of the beings depicted: 
“….angels? (questioning intonation) I don’t know…um…um…God? (questioning intonation) I 
don’t know” 
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However, in a subsequent email, she is sure of their existence and identity: 
“Angels: intense compassion and androgynous. The most real thing I have ever felt”. 
For Leanne, these visions are not nebulous or ambiguous, but clear and meaningful, and 
form an integral part of her spiritual story. Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of ambiguity imply 
that we humans are uncomfortable with ambiguity and always strive for certainty (Lewis 
and Staehler, 2010, p. 190), but perhaps Leanne’s enforced right hemisphere dominance 
made her more ready to embrace the hazy numinosity. 
Ambiguity and windows of clarity 
Although ambiguity was a recurrent leitmotif in the stories, windows of absolute clarity also 
existed, and these were thrown into sharp relief by their contrast with the ambiguity. For 
example, most participants were able to give a clear definition of what spirituality meant for 
them. David and Francesca, for example, maintained that spirituality for them was not 
about organised religion. It is the opposite for the two Christians, Leanne and Joel, who 
equated their spirituality with their faith tradition. Joel demonstrated a complete absence of 
ambiguity when asked what was important in his life; he conveyed this very successfully 
through emphatic intonation, gesture and repetition: 
“Important is God (lots of left hand gesturing and animated intonation) other things, no…no 
God God God God (emphatic), so…” 
Clarity also existed in the telling or retelling of the stroke story; the impression gained from 
asking the group 2 participants to say what happened to them was one of rehearsed or 
practised telling.  In line with Frank’s (2013, p. 53) view that “stories are a way of redrawing 
maps and finding new destinations” for people who have suffered or are suffering from 
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illness, it is as if through the telling and retelling of the catastrophe, these participants were 
somehow able to start to make sense of what happened to them. Developing Frank’s (2013, 
p. 53) wreckage analogy, it is as if telling the story of the illness anchored the storyteller as 
he or she navigated the chaos. 
Conclusion 
Ambiguity as a concept propounded by Merleau-Ponty proved a useful framework on which 
to analyse the verbal and non-verbal data collected in this study, because  
- spirituality as a concept can be viewed as nebulous and unformed  
- aphasia can result in ambiguities of expression and comprehension 
- stroke and aphasia can result in a blurring of identity and roles  
Spirituality may not be able to be definitively defined, yet the concept resonated with most 
of the participants in the study, so that nearly all of them were able to express what 
spirituality meant to them. Difficult, nebulous, partially formed ideas and concepts can be 
broached with people with aphasia, if we are prepared to dwell with the ambiguity, and if 
we offer facilitative listening, by employing a “phenomenological attitude” (van Manen, 
2016) of openness and curiosity. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty (2002, p. 228) hints at the spiritual 
nature of human language itself, calling it a “revelation of intimate being and of the psychic 
link which unites us in the world and our fellow men” (sic). 
Aphasia can create an atmosphere of ambiguity and misunderstandings. Salient features of 
expressive aphasia include word retrieval difficulties, which may result in neologisms, 
paraphasias, fillers or circumlocution. Syntax may be elusive, so that sentence structure 
becomes simplified or constrained. The inherent ambiguity within aphasic language, 
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however, may be construed as a benefit when one is discussing hazy, unformed concepts, 
such as spirituality. McGilchrist (2010, p. 83) speculates that the right hemisphere of the 
cerebral cortex is more comfortable with ambiguity and haziness than its left hemisphere 
cousin: 
“the left hemisphere’s affinity for what it itself has made (here language), well-worn 
familiarity, certainty and finitude, and, on the other, the right hemisphere’s affinity for all 
that is ‘other’, new, unknown, uncertain and unbounded.” 
In most individuals, language predominantly inhabits the left hemisphere of the cerebral 
cortex. Patients with aphasia following stroke usually have their site of lesion in the left 
hemisphere.  There exists the possibility that people with an impaired left hemisphere, 
where certainty abounds, use their unimpaired hemisphere to embrace ambiguity and all 
that is uncertain and unproven. They may revel in the ambiguity of the master (right) 
hemisphere, and therefore be more amenable to discussions of a numinous nature than 
their right-hemisphere-damaged counterparts, or, indeed, those with no impairment of the 
cerebral cortex. 
McGilchrist further contends that in order to comprehend the whole in a narrative – that is, 
to understand not just the grammatical structure and lexical choice with which the left 
hemisphere deals, but also the nuances of prosody, inference and metaphor which are the 
preserve of the right (Bryan, 1988) – one is reliant on the master hemisphere:   
“the understanding of narrative is a right hemisphere skill: the left hemisphere cannot 
follow a narrative. “ (McGilchrist, 2010, p. 76).  
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The emissary (left) hemisphere “has a particular affinity for words and concepts for tools, 
man-made things, mechanisms and whatever is not alive” (McGilchrist, 2010, p. 55), 
whereas for the right hemisphere, “its utterances are implicit” (McGilchrist, 2010, p. 73), 
and therefore may be more adept at expressing the non-specific.  
One might contend, then, that the right hemisphere and its propensity for the ill-defined 
and nuanced is better equipped to consider and communicate issues of a spiritual nature, 
perhaps not in words but through non-verbal communication strategies. 
It may be that, as healthcare professionals, we need to dwell with this ambiguous output 
more, in order to understand our clients with aphasia, and to attend to their spiritual issues, 
as well as their physical and psychological ones.  
Throughout the study, identities were sometimes obfuscated or altered. As people with 
aphasia often experience a change or loss of identity (Ellis-Hill and Horn, 2000; Shadden, 
2005), an attempt was made to emphasise the identities of the participants in this study by 
giving them pseudonyms as opposed to a number or letter. As clinicians, we need to be 
mindful of potential feelings of lost or altered identity and strive to reinstate this through 
referring to past roles, employment and past-times in our interactions with clients. 
Merleau-Ponty has been identified in the nursing literature as an “excellent fit” (Thomas, 
2005, p 63) in terms of providing a conceptual framework, and so he proved in this study in 
relation to his ideas on the concept of ambiguity. The ambiguous concept of spirituality was 
explored with a client group who displayed some ambiguity of role post-stroke and who at 
times demonstrated ambiguities in their communication abilities. 
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Merleau-Ponty’s (2002, p 387) assertion that ambiguity is a normal, natural, positive aspect 
of the human condition validates the language of aphasia, and perhaps also the study of the 
nebulous concept of spirituality with stroke survivors.  
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